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IMPLICATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER DIVERSIFICATION ON
CORPORATE LAW AND ORGANIZATION: THE CASE OF
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
PETER V. LETSOU*
INTRODUCTION
To be sure, there is no single formulation of the nearly two-
century-old business judgment rule.1 But, as is typical in matters of
corporate law, the Delaware formulation is probably the best known.
Although Delaware's standards have shifted over the years, since
1984 the Delaware Supreme Court has consistently characterized the
business judgment rule as:
[A] presumption that in making a business decision the directors of
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be re-
spected by the courts[, with t]he burden [being] on the party chal-
lenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.2
As a practical matter, the presumption established by the busi-
ness judgment rule is all but impossible to overcome, at least in cases
where directors lack any apparent conflict of interest. In that context,
shareholder-plaintiffs are required to show either that the substance
of the challenged business decision was so egregious that "no
reasonable business person would have made the decision, ' 3 or that
* Professor of Law & Director, Center for Corporate Law, University of Cincinnati
College of Law. J.D., University of Chicago, 1986; B.A., Harvard University, 1983. I would like
to thank Barry Adler, Henry Manne, Larry Ribstein and participants at the Chicago-Kent
College of Law's Theory Informs Business Practice Symposium on April 6, 2001 for their
comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. The business judgment rule has been traced to three nineteenth-century decisions:
Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503 (1857); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829);
and Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850). See generally Marcia M. McMurray,
Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business
Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1987).
2. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). For a leading
discussion of pre-Aronson formulations of the business judgment rule, see S. Samuel Arsht, The
Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
3. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264, 266 (Del. 2000) (noting that "[i]rrationality is the
outer limit of the business judgment rule" and that "[i]rrationality may be the functional
equivalent of the waste test," which requires a showing that "no reasonable business person
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the board was grossly negligent in informing itself of all material
information reasonably available to it before acting.4  To my
knowledge, the former showing has never been made (at least in a
case involving an award of money damages), 5 and the latter only
rarely.6 So in Delaware, the business judgment rule goes much of the
way towards putting disinterested business decisions beyond judicial
scrutiny.7
In other jurisdictions, the protections afforded to corporate
officers and directors by the business judgment rule may not be as
powerful. For instance, the American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance states that a director who makes a business
would have made the decision ... under [the particular] circumstances"); see also Parnes v.
Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) ("The presumptive validity of a business
judgment is rebutted in those rare cases where the decision under attack is 'so far beyond the
bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than
bad faith."' (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (1988))); In re 3COM Corp.
S'holders' Litig., No. C.A. 16721, 1999 WL 1009210, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999) (stating that
to establish a claim of waste the plaintiff must "establish a complete failure of consideration" or
acts that were "so blatant that no ordinary business person would ever consider the transaction
to be fair to the corporation"); Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384 (Del. Ch. 1997). In Zupnick,
the court stated:
To state a cognizable claim for waste where there is no contention that the directors
were interested or that shareholder ratification was improperly obtained, the well-
pleaded allegations of the complaint must support the conclusion that "no person of
ordinary, sound business judgment would say that the consideration received for the
options was a fair exchange for the options granted." That is "an extreme test, very
rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff," because "if under the circumstances any
reasonable person might conclude that the deal made sense, then the judicial inquiry
ends."
Id. at 387 (citations and footnotes omitted).
4. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259.
5. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996). The Gagliardi
court noted:
There is a theoretical exception to this general statement that holds that some
decisions may be so "egregious" that liability for losses they cause may follow even in
the absence of proof of conflict of interest or improper motivation. The exception,
however, has resulted in no awards of money judgments against corporate officers or
directors in this jurisdiction and, to my knowledge only the dubious holding in this
Court of Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., seems to grant equitable relief in the
absence of a claimed conflict or improper motivation.
Id. at 1051-52 (citation omitted).
6. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
7. S. Samuel Arsht, a leading Delaware attorney who served as chairman of the drafting
committee that prepared the 1967 revision of the Delaware General Corporation Law, offered a
spirited challenge to this interpretation of Delaware law in a 1979 article in the Hofstra Law
Review. See Arsht, supra note 2. In that article, Mr. Arsht suggested that "the primary function
of the business judgment rule may be simply to accord to directors the same necessary
protection that professionals [(such as doctors and lawyers)] enjoy under Anglo-American tort
law if sued for malpractice." Id. at 97. This view of the business judgment rule is not one that
has found wide support. Cf. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.) ("While
it is often stated that corporate directors and officers will be liable for negligence in carrying out
their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is misleading.").
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judgment fulfills his duty of care to the corporation only if he "is
informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent [he] reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances," and he "rationally believes that the business
judgment is in the best interests of the corporation."' Similarly, new
section 8.31 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides
that a director can be held liable to the corporation or any share-
holder for a good faith, disinterested business decision if the "director
did not reasonably believe" the decisions "to be in the best interests
of the corporation," or "the director was not informed to an extent
the director reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances." 9
These standards suggest somewhat greater judicial scrutiny of
disinterested business decisions than would be applied in Delaware.
But even so, something more than a showing of ordinary negligence is
clearly required before liability can be imposed. And, in any case,
even under the more liberal standards that exist outside of Delaware,
few cases can be found that actually impose liability on corporate
directors for flawed, but disinterested, business decisions.'0
What explains the traditional reluctance of courts to second-
guess business decisions made by disinterested directors? This
question is particularly puzzling given the considerably greater
willingness of courts to second-guess decisions of other professionals,
such as doctors, lawyers and engineers." Over the years, courts and
commentators have offered a variety of explanations for the
deference afforded directors. These include: (1) the limited ability of
judges and juries who are not business experts to evaluate compli-
8. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS §
4.01(c) (1994).
9. REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (2001).
10. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-1100 (1968)
(finding only four cases where directors of industrial, as opposed to financial, corporations had
been held potentially liable for negligence in the absence of self-dealing); see also Joy, 692 F.2d
at 885. In Joy, Judge Winter writes:
Whereas an automobile driver who makes a mistake in judgment as to speed or
distance injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon to respond in damages, a
corporate officer who makes a mistake in judgment as to economic conditions,
consumer tastes or production line efficiency will rarely, if ever, be found liable for
damages suffered by the corporation.
Id. (citing Symposium, Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, 27 BUS.
LAW. 1 (1971); MORTIMER FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS 28-42 (2d ed. 1974)).
11. For a comparison of the business judgment rule with liability standards that apply to
doctors, see Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994).
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cated business decisions, (2) the need to encourage entrepreneurial
risk taking by corporate directors who might otherwise avoid business
risks (or even refuse to serve) if they faced potential negligence
liability, (3) the availability of other mechanisms, such as employment
and securities markets, to provide corporate directors with incentives
to avoid mismanagement and (4) the voluntary assumption by
shareholders of business risk in exchange for a potential return on
their investment which is contractually unlimited. 12 The difficulty
with these rationales, as will be explored more fully below, is not so
much that they lack truth (though this is sometimes the case), but
rather that they frequently "prove too much" because they "apply
with equal force to numerous other situations in which the rule of
ordinary negligence commonly applies. '13
Against this backdrop, this Article develops a different explana-
tion for the business judgment rule, one that focuses on the special
preferences of diversified shareholders. As is explained more fully
below, shareholders are unique among legal principals in their ability
to diversify away much of the risk (i.e., uncertainty as to future
outcomes) associated with acts of their agents, the corporation's
officers and directors. Indeed, the analysis in Part III suggests that
shareholders can typically diversify away as much as 80 to 90 percent
of the risk associated with an individual project.14 Because sharehold-
ers need not take risks that they can eliminate through diversification,
shareholders generally prefer their agents to ignore such risks in
assessing the adequacy of project returns. By insulating managers
from personal liability for corporate losses, the business judgment
rule helps achieve this goal.15
12. See generally 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1037 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1994).
13. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or
Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL L. REV. 287, 304-05 (1994).
14. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
15. It should be noted that the theory offered here cannot explain the apparent adoption of
the business judgment rule in the early nineteenth century, when few investors could obtain the
benefits of diversification. In this regard, it is interesting to note that many of the earliest
business judgment cases appear to have used the language of ordinary negligence. See generally
McMurray, supra note 1. Indeed, in his article noted above, Mr. Arsht relied on many of these
early cases to support his argument that the business judgment rule afforded directors no more
protection than that provided to other professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, in
professional malpractice actions. See Arsht, supra note 2. So it is at least possible that the
modem, more protective form of the business judgment rule is of more recent vintage. It should
also be noted that the arguments advanced in this Article do not necessarily extend to closely
held corporations, where many shareholders may lack sufficient resources to fully diversify
away the firm-specific risk associated with their investment.
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Professors Fischel and Bradley hint at a similar explanation for
the business judgment rule in their path-breaking article, The Role of
Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.16 They note, among other things,
that:
If agents are penalized for poor outcomes, as well as poor perform-
ance, they will tend to undertake lower risk projects. This tendency
to cause agents to behave in a more risk-averse manner is itself a
potentially large cost of liability rules as a governance mechanism
in contractual situations where principals want agents to behave in
a more risk-neutral manner.17
But while Professors Fischel and Bradley suggest differing prefer-
ences of diversified shareholders and directors for risk as one basis
for the business judgment rule, they devote only two paragraphs of
their paper to the point. This brevity has, in my view, caused at least
two problems: first, Fischel and Bradley's point' is often missed (or
misunderstood), possibly because it is seen as embodying little more
than the concern that risk-averse directors, who can be sued on
ordinary negligence principles, will avoid riskier courses of action that
shareholders may prefer, a concern that inheres in all principal-agent
relationships (i.e., doctor-patient and lawyer-client, as well as
shareholder-manager); and second, Fischel and Bradley's brief
analysis is incomplete, for, as will be explored later, while diversified
shareholders want managers to ignore the variance in potential future
returns from some types of project risks (i.e., diversifiable ones), they
still want managers to pay close attention to the variance from others
(i.e., nondiversifiable or market risks), as well as to the overall level
of a project's expected returns. Accordingly, while the business
judgment rule offers the benefit of insulating managers from
components of risk that diversified shareholders want ignored, the
rule comes at the cost of weakening legal incentives to consider other
relevant factors. Thus, differing preferences of managers and
shareholders for business risk can only support the business judgment
rule if the benefits from the rule exceed the costs.
Fischel and Bradley emphasize that the costs of the business
judgment rule are low, largely due to the availability of other
mechanisms to constrain managerial misconduct. 18 But Fischel and
16. Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative
Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986).
17. Id. at 270; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1442 (1985).
18. Fischel & Bradley, supra note 16, at 274-76.
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Bradley pay less attention to the magnitude of the benefits from the
business judgment rule, leaving the ultimate balance between costs
and benefits uncertain. In addition, Fischel and Bradley's focus on
the limited costs of the business judgment rule does little to
distinguish corporate managers from other professionals, such as
doctors and lawyers, who also face important constraints on their
conduct apart from legal liability to patients and clients for profes-
sional malpractice. Accordingly, a fuller development of the
connection between the preferences of the diversified shareholder
and the business judgment rule is both appropriate and necessary.
The analysis below proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the
meaning of investor diversification and its impact on shareholder
preferences for the conduct of corporate managers; Part II explains
and critiques the traditional justifications for the business judgment
rule; Part III develops the link between the preferences of diversified
shareholders and the business judgment rule.
I. THE MEANING OF DIVERSIFICATION AND ITS IMPACT ON
INVESTOR PREFERENCES
The concept of diversification is a familiar one, both to the so-
phisticated student of corporate finance and to the casual investor.
Quite simply, diversification refers to the practice by investors of
investing their capital in a larger number of companies rather than a
smaller number. Investors can diversify their investment portfolios
directly by instructing their brokers to purchase relatively small
numbers of shares in a relatively large number of companies, or
indirectly by purchasing shares in one or more mutual funds whose
holdings include investments in many different firms.
The principal benefit of diversification is that it eliminates a large
portion of the risk associated with investing. This means that a
diversified investor is better able to predict the future value of his
investment portfolio than is an undiversified one. In other words, the
range of potential future outcomes faced by the diversified investor is
narrowed.
An example can illustrate the capacity of diversification to re-
duce the risk of investing. Consider an investor who has $400 and two
investment options. Option #1 is to invest the full $400 in the stock of
a single company, which will dedicate that $400 (and money obtained
from other investors) to a single project whose outcome is not certain.
The results of the company's investment will be determined at the
[Vol. 77:179
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end of one year by flipping a coin: if the coin comes up heads, the
company will earn a 150% return on the invested funds, so that the
investor will receive a total of $1,000 at the end of the year; if, on the
other hand, the coin comes up tails, the company's investment in the
project will be lost, and the investor will receive nothing. Option #2 is
to invest 40 cents in each of 1,000 different companies, each of whom
will invest the 40 cents (together with funds received from other
investors) in a single project with the same risk and return character-
istics as the project considered under Option #1. Accordingly, the
success or failure of each project will be determined by a separate
coin flip at the end of one year, with heads meaning success and a
150% return on the invested funds (or a $1 return on a 40 cent
investment) and tails meaning failure.
The outcome of the second investment option is far more certain
for the investor than the first. Assuming that we use a fair coin to
determine the outcome of each of the 1,000 projects (i.e., a coin with a
50% probability of coming up heads and a 50% probability of coming
up tails), we can be very certain that the investor who chooses Option
#2 will end up with $500 (or something very close to it) at the end of
one year, since 1,000 coin flips will likely yield approximately 500
heads and 500 tails. The outcome of the second investment option,
however, could not be more uncertain: after one year, the investor
will have either $1,000 or nothing, depending on the outcome of a
single flip of a coin. So by choosing Option #2, the investor can
eliminate much of the risk (i.e., uncertainty) associated with investing,
even if he has no idea which of the companies in his portfolio will
prove to be winners and which will prove to be losers.
To be sure, even the diversified investor under Option #2 still
faces some uncertainty. For instance, we cannot be certain that 1,000
coin flips will result in precisely 500 heads and 500 tails; we could
have 510 heads and 490 tails, 487 heads and 513 tails, or, less likely,
even greater disparities. In addition, it is at least possible that coins
of the future may be manufactured so that heads and tails are no
longer equally probable. In other words, there may be risks that are
endemic to the entire market, such as movements in interest rates,
changes in technology, and shifts in consumer spending. (The risks
which remain even when investors have diversified to the fullest
extent possible are generally referred to in the finance literature as
market, systemic or undiversifiable risk, 9 while those that can be
19. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
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eliminated through diversification are referred to as unique,
unsystemic, residual, specific or diversifiable risk.20) But even taking
full account of the market risks present in my example, we still end up
with the result that the diversified investor in Option #2 faces less risk
(or uncertainty) than the undiversified investor in Option #1: the
undiversified investor will have either nothing or $1,000 after one
year, while the diversified investor faces, at worst, a continuum of
results from zero, on the one hand, to $1,000, on the other, with the
precise distribution depending on the level of market risk.
For the typical investor who dislikes risk, diversification is clearly
the rational investment strategy to follow. This is because diversifi-
cation allows the investor to eliminate risk without sacrificing
financial return. A return to the two investment options considered
above illustrates this result. For both Option #1 and Option #2, the
expected return (i.e., the probability weighted average of all potential
outcomes) is $500.21 But while Option #1 and Option #2 have the
same expected return, Option #2 provides that return while subjecting
the investor to a lesser degree of risk. Accordingly, for the typical
investor who requires additional financial returns in order to entice
him to take additional risk, Option #2 (diversification) is the sensible
choice. And indeed, diversification appears to be the strategy that
most investors follow, as illustrated by the present-day popularity of
mutual funds.
That diversification makes sense for most investors does not
mean, however, that diversification makes sense for all investors. For
instance, investors who enjoy preferential access to information about
particular companies may choose to "de-diversify" (i.e., hold more or
less of the stock of that company than a diversified investor would) in
order to maximize their gains by trading based on that information. 2
Corporate managers may agree to accept a portion of their compen-
sation in company stock or options to improve their incentives to
manage more efficiently, provided that the value of the stock and
156 & n.15 (5th ed. 1996). This Article refers to this type of risk as "market risk."
20. Id. at 156 & n.14. This Article refers to this type of risk as "diversifiable risk."
21. In the case of Option #1, we have a 50% probability of a $1,000 payoff and a 50%
probability of zero payoff, for an expected payoff of (.5 x $1,000) + (.5 x $0) or $500; in the case
of Option #2, we have 1,000 separate investments, each of which has a 50% probability of a
$1.00 payoff and a 50% probability of a zero payoff, for an expected payoff of 1000 x [(.5 x
$1.00) + (.5 x $0)] or $500.
22. For a discussion of de-diversification to gain profits from insider trading, see Merritt B.
Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section
16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088 (1994).
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options exceeds the cash compensation foregone by a sufficient
amount to compensate for the additional risk. Institutional investors
who believe that public companies may be made more valuable if
investors actively monitor management may choose to de-diversify in
order to capture a greater share of the benefits (i.e., increase in stock
price) that result from their monitoring. And still other investors may
choose to de-diversify in order to reap the gains associated with
taking over publicly held companies whose performance appears to
be lagging. In each of these instances, the extra returns from de-
diversifying may well offset the costs (i.e., taking on uncompensated,
diversifiable risk). Finally, even some ordinary investors may choose
to de-diversify for much the same reason that people buy lottery
tickets and travel to Atlantic City or Las Vegas: these investors are
risk-preferring (rather than risk-averse), albeit with respect to a
greater portion of their wealth than is typical. But despite these
departures, diversification undoubtedly remains the dominant
investment strategy.
We then come to the $64,000 question: How do diversified inves-
tors want managers of the firms in which they invest to behave?
Financial economics gives an answer that is easy to state, but
somewhat more difficult to understand: all diversified investors
(regardless of the compositions of their particular portfolios) want
corporate managers to invest in projects that have a positive net
present value, meaning projects that offer a rate of return on invested
funds that is superior to the return that the market demands for an
investment of comparable market (rather than overall) risk. The
reason for this focus on market risk is that market risk is the only
component of project risk that the diversified investor takes; all other
components of project risk are irrelevant because they are offset by
the diversified investor's other holdings.
To illustrate the operation of the net present value rule, consider
a world in which financial markets demand a rate of return of 5% on
investments with no sensitivity to market risk (i.e., investments whose
outcomes are independent of movements in the market as a whole).
An example of such an investment might be a government bond,
which for all intents and purposes is considered to be risk free. Under
such circumstances, investors want the firm's managers to accept any
project of comparable market risk (i.e., zero in this example) that
offers a rate of return greater than 5%. And they want managers to
make this choice even if the particular project, when examined in
isolation, is extremely risky because of the presence of a high level of
2001]
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diversifiable risk. In other words, in determining whether the
expected returns from a particular project are sufficient to compen-
sate for risk, diversified investors want the firm's managers to ignore
all uncertainty associated with the project that can be eliminated
through diversification, even if the firm itself is not diversified.
The rationale for the net present value rule is simple: if all corpo-
rate managers follow the net present value rule, then the market
value of the diversified investor's portfolio will increase. Again, an
example can best illustrate the proposition. In Option #2 discussed
above, the investor made 1,000 different investments of 40 cents each.
Does the investor want the managers of the firms in which he has
invested to accept the projects discussed earlier-i.e., projects that
have a 50% probability of generating a 150% return after one year
(meaning a $1.00 return on a 40 cent investment) and a 50%
probability of returning nothing? Assuming for purposes of the
following analysis that financial markets demand a 5% return on a
risk-free investment, the answer is yes.
If we know for sure that a fair coin will be used to determine the
outcome of each of the 1,000 projects, each of the 1,000 projects has
no market risk. In other words, the success or failure of any
particular project is independent of the success or failure of any other.
Accordingly, the net present value rule implies that each project
should be accepted so long as its expected rate of return exceeds 5%,
the rate of return the market demands for risk-free investments.
Under the facts provided, the expected rate of return for each project
is 25% (i.e., a 50% probability of a 150% return and a 50%
probability of a 100% loss or .5 x 150% + .5 x [-100%] or 25%).
Because this exceeds the market rate of return for an investment of
comparable market risk, the net present value rule dictates accep-
tance of the project.
What happens to the value of the diversified investor's portfolio
if the managers of each of the 1,000 firms act in accordance with the
net present value? Before the managers made the investment
decision required by the net present value rule, the investor under
Option #2 had a portfolio worth $400 (1,000 separate investments
worth 40 cents each). If each manager makes the investment that the
net present value rule requires, then we know that the investor's
portfolio will almost certainly be worth $500 after one year (i.e., the
coin will come up heads in 500 cases and tails in 500 cases, meaning
that the total payout to the investor will be $500). In an economy
where the market rate of return on an investment with no market risk
[Vol. 77:179
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is 5%, the present value of the investor's portfolio, assuming each
company accepts the 50/50 bet under Option #2, will be approxi-
mately $476 (i.e., $500/[1 + .05])-that is, an investor will pay $476
today for a risk-free promise of $500 in one year. So by ignoring the
diversifiable risk associated with the project in assessing the adequacy
of the project's expected returns, the firm's managers have increased
the value of the investor's portfolio from $400 to $476.
If, however, the managers of the various firms ignore the dictates
of the net present value rule and consider diversifiable risk, as well as
market risk, in evaluating the project under consideration, we get a
different result. In this instance, the managers will consider whether
the expected rate of return of 25% is sufficient to compensate, not for
a sure thing, but for an investment that might be worth a lot in one
year or might be worth nothing at all. That range of potential
outcomes represents a high degree of risk; accordingly, it is at least
possible that managers would deem a 25% expected return
insufficient to compensate for project risk. As a consequence, all
managers may elect to reject the proposed investment with the result
that the investor will be left with a portfolio worth only $400, a far
less desirable result than if the dictates of the net present value rule
had been followed.
It should be noted that the example considered above involved a
project with zero market risk. But the result that the value of the
diversified investor's portfolio increases if managers follow the net
present value rule holds equally well for projects where some market
risk remains even for investors who have diversified their investment
portfolios to the fullest extent possible: so long as the project's
expected rate of return is greater than the market rate of return for
projects of comparable market (rather than overall) risk, the value of
the diversified investor's portfolio will increase if corporate managers
accept the project.
It should also be noted that the result that diversified investors
benefit if managers follow the net present value rule in no way
depends on the composition of the particular investor's portfolio.
Some investors may like portfolios with higher levels of market risk
and correspondingly higher levels of expected returns (i.e., portfolios
rich in internet and biotech stocks), while other investors prefer lower
levels of market risk and correspondingly lower levels of expected
returns (i.e., portfolios that match broader indices like the S&P 500,
20011
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perhaps mixed with more conservative investments like government
bonds),23 But both sets of investors (those who prefer higher risk
portfolios and those who prefer lower risk portfolios) benefit when
managers follow the net present value rule, even when following the
net present value rule results in an alteration of the overall risk of the
investor's portfolio. To see why this is so, consider the position of an
investor who prefers high risk and high returns after the managers of
one company in his portfolio make a new low risk investment that is
required by the net present value rule. This new investment may
result in a portfolio with lower risk and lower expected returns than
the investor prefers. But the investor is nonetheless made better off
by the new investment because he can sell his new higher valued
portfolio, use the cash generated from the sale to purchase a portfolio
with the risk and return attributes of his original portfolio, and pocket
the leftover cash. We know there will be cash left over because the
new portfolio created by following the net present value rule
necessarily has a higher market value than the old one. The same
result holds for an investor who sees the risk of his portfolio increased
as the result of an investment decision dictated by the net present
value. 24
Accordingly, if the world included only diversified shareholders,
the net present value rule, which requires managers to ignore
diversifiable risk when evaluating the expected return from firm
projects, would clearly be the rule of choice. But as noted earlier, 25
not all investors are diversified, because, in at least some instances,
the extra returns available from de-diversifying may more than
compensate for the extra risk. Undiversified investors care about
both the market risk and the diversifiable risk of any new investment
23. Under ideal circumstances, all investors would hold the same market portfolio and
satisfy their individual preferences for risk and return by either borrowing or lending at the risk-
free rate of interest. Those who wanted lower risk and lower return would lend some of their
money at the risk-free rate of interest (i.e., replace a portion of their investment in the market
portfolio with government bonds), while those who wanted higher risk and higher return would
increase their investment in the market portfolio by borrowing at the risk-free rate of interest.
That each investor should put his money in two benchmark investments-the market portfolio
and risk-free loans or borrowing-is known as the Separation Theorem and was first put forth
by J. Tobin in J. Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 REV. ECON. STUD.
64 (Feb. 1958). In fact, all investors do not behave as the Separation Theorem predicts, in large
part, because many investors are not able to borrow at the risk-free rate of interest.
Accordingly, investors who prefer higher risk and higher returns often satisfy their preferences
by purchasing higher risk portfolios. See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 19, at 179;
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS app. at 6-8 (3d ed. 1996).
24. Nor does the result depend upon the timing preferences of investors. See BREALEY &
MYERS, supra note 19, at 17-24.
25. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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because, by definition, their holdings are not spread thinly enough to
fully eliminate the diversifiable risk associated with a new investment.
Accordingly, we would expect undiversified investors to want their
agents, the firm's managers, to care about diversifiable risk as well.
The question then arises: Does the presence of undiversified investors
in the marketplace undermine the net present value rule as the
guiding principle for corporate managers?
The answer to this question is no. First, diversification appears
to be the dominant strategy in the marketplace, so the losses from
departing from the net present value rule would likely exceed the
gains. Second, at least some undiversified investors will only be
undiversified for short periods of time, such as when they are in
possession of nonpublic information that they may use to generate
trading profits. Third, many other undiversified investors, such as
institutional investors who engage in active monitoring, are
undiversified for the very purpose of ensuring that stock prices rise
(i.e., for ensuring that managers follow the net present value rule).
Such investors will only profit from de-diversifying if the firm's stock
price rises in the long-term, a goal which may be jeopardized if short-
term departures from the net present value rule are regularly
tolerated.
Finally, even undiversified investors will generally benefit from
managerial decisions that follow the dictates of the net present value
rule. First, such decisions will result in increases in the market price
of the firm's shares, even if they also result in increases in the
diversifiable risk faced by undiversified investors. This result follows
because diversified investors, who, by definition, are indifferent to
diversifiable risk, determine the market price of a firm's shares. 26
Second, because diversifiable risk is not priced in the marketplace
(i.e., securities with high levels of diversifiable risk sell for the same
price as securities with low levels of diversifiable risk, assuming their
market risks and expected returns are the same), undiversified
investors should be able to readjust the diversifiable risk of their
portfolios at a relatively modest cost by swapping securities with
higher levels of diversifiable risk for ones with lower levels of
diversifiable risk. Accordingly, as long as the transaction costs
associated with these risk-adjusting trades are less than the increases
26. That diversified investors determine the market price of a firm's shares is implicit in the
Capital Assets Pricing Model, which predicts that investors should be concerned primarily with
risks that cannot be eliminated through diversification. This aspect of the Capital Assets Pricing
Model has broad support. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 19, at 184.
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in the market value of the undiversified investor's shares, undiversi-
fied investors, as well as diversified ones, should generally benefit
from managerial decisions that follow the net present value rule.
That managers should follow the net present value desired by
diversified investors has been challenged by some. For instance,
Professor Richard Booth has argued that management duties should
not be defined with reference to the interests of diversified share-
holders because doing so "[(1)] would require management to
identify a single clientele of investors whose interests should be
served, [(2)] would often lead management to undertake strategies
which were redundant of cheaper stockholder strategies and [(3)]
would sometimes compel management to divert returns which would
ordinarily flow to other constituencies. 27 Instead, Professor Booth
argues "it is probably the better view that management duty should
be interpreted as if it is owed to the corporation or to a reasonable
undiversified stockholder."2 Professor Booth's arguments are, in my
view, flawed.
First, Professor Booth is not correct when he states that focusing
on diversified shareholders is impractical because it requires
management to consider the wealth effects of its decisions "in many
different portfolios with many different goals. 2 9  As the above
discussion of the net present value rule demonstrates, 30 and as
corporate finance texts confirm, the beauty of the net present value
rule is that it enables managers to make capital investment decisions
without "know[ing] anything about the personal tastes of their
shareholders.... Their task is to maximize net present value. If they
succeed, they can rest assured that they have acted in the best
interests of their shareholders."31 Clearly, the net present value rule
rests on assumptions, such as well-functioning capital markets, that
may not always hold.32 But the available evidence suggests that
capital markets function fairly well, and that the net present value
rule generally furthers the interests of shareholders, even if imperfect
markets and transactions costs sometimes cause it to fail.33
27. Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor
Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429, 447 (1998).
28. Id. at 456.
29. Id. at 447.
30. See supra p. 188-89.
31. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 19, at 24.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 23-24.
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Second, Professor Booth's statement that a focus on diversified
shareholders would frequently lead management to undertake
strategies which are redundant of cheaper stockholder strategies is
not supported by the evidence. The suggestion here appears to be
that managers who focused on the interests of diversified share-
holders would pursue such strategies as company-level diversification
through the formation of conglomerates, even though the best
evidence suggests that shareholders dislike company-level diversifi-
cation (because even shareholders of modest means can diversify
more easily and cheaply on their own).14 The problem with Professor
Booth's analysis is that there is no reason to believe that a diversified
shareholder would favor company-level diversification. Indeed, there
is every reason to believe just the opposite because a shareholder who
is fully diversified has absolutely nothing to gain from further
diversification by the companies in which he invests.
Third, we come to Professor Booth's statement that focusing on
the interests of diversified shareholders would sometimes compel
management to divert returns that would ordinarily flow to other
constituencies, such as creditors. This may indeed be the case,
particularly as a company nears bankruptcy, because shareholders of
nearly insolvent firms have little to lose and everything to gain by
causing the firm to speculate with assets that, in effect, belong to the
firm's creditors. But throwing out the net present value rule because
of its perverse effects on companies nearing bankruptcy seems to be
overkill. The better solution, I believe, is the one the courts have
generally adopted: extending fiduciary duties of managers to the
firm's creditors when the firm nears insolvency. 3
34. Booth, supra note 27, at 451-52.
35. See, e.g., LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292 (D. Del. 2000)
(holding that officers and directors of an insolvent corporation have a "fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of the estate as a whole, including its creditors, equity interest holders and
other parties in interest") (emphasis added); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l,
Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (stating that directors owe fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty to creditors when a transaction leaves the corporation "insolvent or with
unreasonably small capital," so the trustee in bankruptcy can sue directors even though the
challenged transaction did not injure the corporation's stockholders); Odyssey Partners v.
Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 420 (Del. Ch. 1999) (rejecting stockholder complaints that the
board should have filed for bankruptcy, rather than allowing foreclosure action, because the
board of an insolvent corporation was "obligated to consider and protect interests other than
those of the stockholders"; the effect of corporate action on "shareholders, creditors and other
corporate constituencies" had to be balanced); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. C.A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) ("At
least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not
merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.").
See generally Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of
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Finally, we face what I believe is the most problematic part of
Professor Booth's analysis: his statement that shareholders would be
better off if management duties were defined with respect to the
"reasonable undiversified shareholder." First, because each
undiversified shareholder's portfolio will be marked by a different
level of diversifiable risk, there is simply no single reasonable
undiversified shareholder to whom managers can refer in assessing
the impact of a new corporate project; that is, the same project may
result in an increase in diversifiable risk for one investor and a
decrease for another. Indeed, the differences among undiversified
investors are likely to be far greater than the differences among
diversified ones, particularly given the ability of all diversified
investors to agree on the rationality of the net present value rule.
Second, the evidence that Professor Booth cites to support his view
that shareholders favor defining management duties with reference to
undiversified investors is equivocal at best. Professor Booth relies
primarily on the decision by many companies to "pay a substantial
portion of compensation in the form of stock options. '36 Professor
Booth argues that this decision causes management to view decisions
more as an undiversified investor would.
But there is another way to view option compensation that is
consistent with the preferences of diversified shareholders for the net
present value rule. Insiders typically make large human capital
investments in their firms (i.e., investments in skills that have reduced
value outside the particular firm), with the result that they are
exposed to a high degree of downside firm-specific risk: if the firm
fails, these firm-specific investments will be lost.37 Accordingly,
insiders have a difficult time ignoring the firm-specific risk that
diversified shareholders wish them to ignore in assessing the
adequacy of project returns. Compensating insiders with options
provides a partial solution to this problem by allowing insiders to
share in the upside benefits of firm-specific risk (thereby offsetting, at
least to some extent, the downside risk they face because of firm-
specific human capital investments). Indeed, the ability of options to
permit insiders to share in the upside benefits of corporate risk taking
without magnifying their downside exposure may partly explain the
popularity of option, as opposed to stock, compensation. Thus,
the Financially Troubled Company, 48 BUS. LAW. 239 (1992).
36. Booth, supra note 27, at 453.
37. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 16, at 269-70.
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compensating insiders with options may make it easier for managers
to act in the interests of diversified investors, not more difficult.
In short, Professor Booth's arguments do not provide persuasive
reasons for abandoning the net present value rule favored by
diversified shareholders as a basic guide for corporate managers.
II. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE
As the analysis in Part III below will illustrate, the insights from
the financial theory discussed above, particularly the insights from the
net present value, provide a powerful explanation for the modern
business judgment rule. But before turning to a closer examination of
the implications of the net present value rule, this Article will first
examine some of the traditional justifications offered for the business
judgment rule. As noted earlier, these explanations include: (1) the
limited ability of judges and juries who are not business experts to
evaluate complicated business decisions, (2) the need to encourage
entrepreneurial risk taking by corporate directors who might
otherwise avoid business risks (or even refuse to serve) if they faced
potential negligence liability, (3) the availability of other mechanisms,
such as employment and securities markets, to provide corporate
directors with incentives to avoid mismanagement and (4) the
voluntary assumption by shareholders of business risk in exchange for
a potential return on their investment which is contractually
unlimited.38 The difficulty with these rationales, as indicated earlier,
is not so much that they lack truth (though this is sometimes the
case), but rather that they frequently "prove too much" because they
"apply with equal force to numerous other situations in which the
rule of ordinary negligence commonly applies. '39 In particular, many
of the rationales commonly offered in support of the business
judgment rule would seem equally applicable to doctors, lawyers and
others who are subject to the considerably more demanding liability
rules of ordinary tort law.
Probably the most common explanation for the deference af-
forded to corporate directors under the business judgment rule is that
"judges simply lack the information and skill necessary to evaluate
business judgments. '40  For example, in Shlensky v. Wrigley,41 a
38. See 3A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 12, § 1037.
39. Gevurtz, supra note 13, at 304-05.
40. See 3A FLETCHER ETAL, supra note 12, § 1037, at 42.
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minority shareholder of the Chicago Cubs baseball team challenged
Philip Wrigley's refusal to install lights at Wrigley Field in Chicago,
alleging, among other things, that (1) all other major league baseball
teams scheduled games at night, (2) attendance at night games
substantially exceeded attendance at day games and (3) the funds for
the installation of lights could be easily obtained. Relying on the
business judgment rule, the court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim. In rendering its decision, the court stated, "[it did]
not mean to say [it had] decided that the decision of the directors [not
to install lights] was a correct one. '42 That determination, the court
stated, was simply "beyond [its] jurisdiction and ability."'43
As others have noted, this justification is problematic at best,
because it "would apply equally to a large number of cases outside of
the corporate law area where negligence liability is routinely
imposed." 44 For example, "judges often have to decide exceedingly
technical factual issues in tort and contract cases, yet no one suggests
that.., a manufacturer should be free to negligently design a jet
engine on the ground that judges are too dim to decide such issues. '45
Along the same lines, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel ask
"why the same judges who decide whether engineers have designed
the compressors on jet engines properly, whether the farmer
delivered pomegranates conforming to industry specifications, and
whether the prison system adversely affects the mental status of
prisoners cannot decide whether a manager negligently failed to sack
a subordinate who made improvident loans. '46 Finally, as Professor
Gevurtz has noted, it is not difficult to imagine a single decision that
would, at once, be scrutinized under ordinary negligence principles in
an action brought by third parties, but be protected by the business
judgment rule in an action by corporate shareholders. As an
example, Professor Gevurtz offers a variation on the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, where a board of directors decided to construct a tanker with
a single hull, rather than a double hull which might have avoided a
catastrophic spill. Professor Gevurtz notes that a suit by coastal
property owners damaged by an oil spill from the tanker would
41. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
42. Id. at 780.
43. Id.
44. 3A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 12, § 1037, at 42.
45. 3A id.
46. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991).
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undoubtedly be governed by ordinary negligence principles, while a
challenge to the same decision by corporate shareholders would be
protected from scrutiny by the business judgment rule.47
A second rationale for the business judgment rule focuses on the
concern that negligence liability would discourage directors from
entrepreneurial risk taking, the very kind of action that shareholders
wish to encourage. This rationale finds its clearest statement in the
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: "The
basic policy underpinning of the business judgment rule is that
corporate law should encourage, and afford broad protection to,
informed business judgments (whether subsequent events prove the
judgments right or wrong) in order to stimulate risk taking,
innovation and other creative entrepreneurial activities. ''4 8 The idea
underlying this rationale for the business judgment rule is that actions
that involve considerable risk for the corporation may often be in the
shareholders' best interests. In the terms of financial economics,
these risky strategies may often constitute the highest net present
value opportunities available to the corporation, even when
discounted for the risk they entail. So shareholders will want
managers to accept these opportunities, even though they realize that
there can be no guarantee of success. But if managers face potential
personal liability if less favorable outcomes result, they may steer
47. Gevurtz, supra note 13, at 325-26. Professor Gevurtz notes a variation on the
"expertise" justification for the business judgment rule. He writes as follows:
If judicial expertise cannot justify different treatment, perhaps there is something
about the nature of business decisions which renders review more speculative. A
number of courts and writers have made the argument that each business decision is
unique, heavily intuitive, and judgmental. These qualities, such courts and writers
assert, both undermine the accuracy of after-the-fact review and are not true of other
fields.
Id. at 308. For a good example of an argument along the lines suggested by Professor Gevurtz,
see Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time
for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477 (1984); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Winter, J.) (noting that "[tihe circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily
reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick
decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information"; so "a reasoned decision at the time
made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge").
Professor Gevurtz rejects these arguments, contending that many professionals (not just
business people) "undertake[] actions in unique situations based upon intuition and experience,
without being able to articulate the exact reason for the course of action." Gevurtz, supra note
13, at 309. He concludes: "To the extent this sort of intuitive 'knowing in action' does not lend
itself to an accurate after-the-fact judicial assessment of reasonableness, then perhaps there is a
need to rethink the standards of malpractice generally." Id.
48. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS, pt.
IV, introductory note (a) (1994); see also E. Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified
Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care
Compared with Delaware Law, 35 BUS. LAW. 919, 931-32 (1980).
2001]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
clear of these risky opportunities. That is, as between two business
opportunities, one which involves a considerable risk of legal liability
because its results are uncertain (i.e., the results may be very good or
they may be very bad), and one which involves little risk of personal
liability because the outcome is clear, corporate managers may
choose the latter, even though, on net present value terms, share-
holders prefer the former. 49
This rationale for the business judgment rule suffers from the
same flaw identified above: the same concerns with deterring risk
taking apply equally in law, medicine and a host of other fields,
because in those fields, as well as in business, risky strategies may
often be consistent with the principal's best interests." For example,
consider the doctor-patient relationship. A patient with a particular
debilitating condition might face two potential courses of medical
treatment: one course might promise, with a degree of certainty, that
the patient will get no worse, but at the same time offer little, if any,
hope of improvement; a second course of treatment, however, might
entail greater risks, both on the upside and the downside. For
instance, the more aggressive treatment might offer a prospect of
complete recovery, subject to a risk of making an already debilitating
49. This rationale for the business judgment rule was adopted by former Chancellor Allen
in Gagliardi v. TriFoods International, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996), where the former
Chancellor wrote:
Corporate directors of public companies typically have a very small proportionate
ownership interest in their corporations and little or no incentive compensation. Thus,
they enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small proportion of any "upside" gains
earned by the corporation on risky investment projects. If, however, corporate
directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a risky project on the
ground that the investment was too risky..., their liability would be joint and several
for the whole loss.... Given the scale of operation of modern public corporations, this
stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens
undesirable effects. Given this disjunction, only a very small probability of director
liability based on "negligence" ... could induce a board to avoid authorizing risky
investment projects to any extent! Obviously, it is in the shareholders' economic
interest to offer sufficient protection to directors from liability for negligence ... to
allow directors to conclude that, as a practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in
good faith and meet minimal proceduralist standards of attention, they can face
liability as a result of a business loss.
Id. at 1052.
50. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 13, at 311-12. Professor Gevurtz writes:
[T]he concern that liability for ordinary negligence will deter directors from taking
worthwhile risks sounds remarkably like the lament of doctors who complain that the
threat of malpractice suits has forced them to engage in "defensive medicine" with the
result of unnecessarily increased costs and the avoidance of worthwhile but more risky
medical treatments. Similar laments can be heard coming from other professionals
faced with liability for negligence. The concern about director liability and risk taking
may well be valid. It is not, however, unique.
Id. at 312 (footnotes omitted).
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condition even worse. It is at least possible that the patient would
prefer the latter course of treatment because the greater reward is
sufficient to compensate for the greater risk. But a doctor, focusing
on the prospect of potential personal liability, might counsel against
it. So a business judgment rule based on encouraging (or at least not
deterring) risk taking would seem to apply to doctors and other
professionals as well as to business people.5
A third explanation for the business judgment rule focuses on the
availability of other mechanisms to provide corporate managers with
incentives to avoid mismanagement. For instance, Professors Fischel
and Bradley have argued that "liability rules play a relatively minor
role in assuring contractual performance by corporate managers in
publicly held corporations. '5 2 They base this statement, in large part,
on the availability of alternative governance mechanisms that deter
managerial misconduct. These alternative mechanisms include: (1)
voting rights that are generally apportioned by shares, rather than
shareholders, so that those with the largest stake in the venture have
the greatest impact on the firm's decision making; (2) freely
transferable shares that facilitate the formation of control blocs and
transfers of control and, therefore, help ensure the removal of
deficient managers; (3) institutional arrangements that make possible
the continuous monitoring of managerial performance, including the
use of independent directors, the sale of securities through investment
bankers, and the use of independent third party accountants to certify
financial statements; (4) efficient capital markets that provide
information about the quality of management that can be used to
measure the value of managers in external labor markets and to
facilitate the operation of the market for corporate control; and (5)
managerial stock ownership and incentive compensation schemes that
link changes in managerial wealth to changes in the value of the >
51. Some have argued that encouraging risk taking in business is acceptable while
encouraging risk taking in fields such as medicine is not. See, e.g., Arkes & Shipani, supra note
11. Professors Arkes and Schipani argue that "Iflailure is acceptable in business but not in
medicine" because "the loss from business failure is usually only economic loss and is seldom
catastrophic for any single individual." Id. at 623. But that the stakes are often larger in the
medical context does not mean that rules discouraging risk taking will be in the interests of
patients. For while the downside risks of certain medical procedures may be great, the upside
rewards may be even greater. For instance, a patient facing a 50 percent risk of death during the
next year may well be willing to take a 10 percent risk of immediate death on the operating
table to gain even a small chance at extending his life by another ten years. So in my view, the
statement that failure is not acceptable in medicine is simply not supported by the evidence.
Indeed, if anything, risk taking may be more important in medicine than in other fields.
52. Fischel & Bradley, supra note 16, at 263.
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firm.53 Although Fischel and Bradley acknowledge that these
alternative governance arrangements do not reduce agency costs (i.e.,
the costs of managerial misconduct) to zero, 54 they suggest that these
arrangements show that liability rules play only a "minor role" in
ensuring that managers act in accordance with shareholder interests.5
The problem with this rationale for the business judgment rule is,
once again, that it fails to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing
corporate managers from other professionals, such as doctors and
lawyers. Like corporate managers, other professionals are clearly
subject to constraints apart from legal liability that deter professional
misconduct. For instance, professional reputation undoubtedly plays
a key role in both law and medicine. 6 Moreover, doctors, lawyers
and other professionals often face potentially career-ending discipline
by licensing bodies, as well as sanctions (including expulsion) from
the organizations where they work, should they be found to have
engaged in professional malpractice. True, those who impose
sanctions on doctors and lawyers (e.g., customers who choose to take
their business elsewhere, licensing boards, and employers) do not
have the benefit of an efficient securities market to help assess
whether a doctor or lawyer has performed appropriately. But the
lack of an efficient market to measure the performance of doctors,
lawyers and other professionals is a double-edged sword: on the one
hand, the absence of such a market may make alternative discipline
systems less effective because misconduct becomes more difficult and
costly to detect; on the other hand, the lack of such a market may
increase the costs associated with liability rules by heightening the
risk that professionals will be adjudged liable for conduct which may
have been wholly justifiable from an ex ante perspective. So, on net,
there is no clear basis for subjecting doctors, lawyers and other
professionals to more expansive liability rules than those applied to
corporate managers.
A final explanation for the business judgment rule focuses on the
shareholders' voluntary assumption of the risk that corporate
managers will make bad business judgments,57 as well as the ability of
shareholders to eliminate or reduce business risk through diversifi-
53. See id. at 274-76.
54. See id. at 276.
55. Id.
56. See Gevurtz, supra note 13, at 320.
57. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (winter, J.).
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cation.58 On this view, investors have opted to purchase stock, rather
than less risky investments (like bonds), because of the potentially
higher returns available from riskier investments. Accordingly, as a
rule, they should not be heard to complain when the risks they have
voluntarily assumed result in losses rather than gains, particularly
since many of the assumed risks can be reduced or eliminated
through diversification. Under this view, legal liability should
generally be precluded because investors have voluntarily assumed
some risks (i.e., the market risks associated with their investments)
and do not take others (i.e., diversifiable ones)59 Building on this
theory, Professor Booth has argued that recovery should never be
allowed for merely negligent bad management because the risk of
negligence can be eliminated through diversification.60  Instead,
Professor Booth suggests that liability should be reserved for
intentional wrongdoing, a risk for which Professor Booth says
diversification offers no protection. 61
In my view, this last rationale for the business judgment rule is
flawed in several ways. First, it mischaracterizes the bargain that
shareholders make when they invest in stock. Shareholders clearly
agree to bear business risk when they elect to invest in common stock,
but only on the condition that managers insist on an expected return
from the company's capital investment activities that is sufficient to
compensate for the market risk associated with those activities. In
other words, shareholders agree to take the risk of bad outcomes that
may follow from good capital investment decisions (i.e., those that
have an expected return sufficient to compensate for market risk);
but they do not agree to take the risk of bad decisions (i.e., those that
could not be justified, on an ex ante basis, by the net present value
rule).
Second, it is not correct to say that liability should not attach
merely because investors can diversify away the risk that resulted in
the loss. For instance, investors may be able to eliminate the risk of
negligent business decisions through diversification. But eliminating
58. Id. at 886.
59. Cf. Booth, supra note 27, at 460-61. Professor Booth writes:
To allow investors to recover damages or obtain other relief in connection with a
risk which the investor has hedged away through diversification is to compensate the
investor for a loss that is never suffered. Indeed, stockholders themselves should favor
a rule that precludes suit in connection with risks that can be diversified away.
Id.
60. Id. at 462.
61. Id.
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the risk of negligent business decisions means only that investors can
predict the total losses to their portfolio from negligent business
decisions with certainty; it does not mean that losses from negligence
will not result.62 Thus, even if diversified investors face no risk (i.e.,
uncertainty) from negligent business decisions, they (or, more
appropriately, the companies in which they invest) may still benefit
from liability rules if such rules reduce the overall level of losses from
negligent business decisions in the economy. 63  In other words,
particular types of risk may have perfectly predictable impacts on the
value of diversified investors' portfolios, but investors (and the
companies in which they invest) may still benefit from liability rules
related to those risks, if the potential for legal liability leads managers
to take cost-effective steps to reduce expected losses. 64
Finally the argument that there should be no recovery for di-
versifiable risks proves too much because, among other things, it
would bar recovery for intentional misconduct, contrary to standard
corporate law principles.65 To avoid this result, Professor Booth
argues that risk of intentional misconduct is not diversifiable because
intentional misconduct always "result[s] in loss no mater how
62. This can be seen by comparing the relatively more familiar situation of a property
insurer who sells fire insurance. If such an insurer covers a sufficient number of insureds, it may
be able to eliminate (or at least greatly reduce) the risk from fires, meaning that the insurer will
be able to predict its total losses from fires with relative certainty. That the insurer eliminates or
reduces the uncertainty associated with fire, however, in no way implies that the insurer has
eliminated the losses from fire. In other words, even if everyone purchased insurance from a
single insurer (thereby pooling the risk from fire to the fullest extent possible), fires and related
losses would still occur.
63. Similarly, fire insurers and their customers may benefit if legal liability for arson or
negligence results in an overall reduction in the incidence of (and damages from) fire, even
though fire insurers have reduced the uncertainty associated with fires to the fullest extent
possible.
64. Professor Booth seems concerned that recovery for diversifiable risks will unfairly
compensate investors for losses they do not suffer. See Booth, supra note 27, at 460. But that
concern is misplaced. As noted above, that the risk (or uncertainty) associated with managerial
misconduct has been eliminated through diversification does not mean that no losses will result
from managerial misconduct; it only means that the overall level of losses in the economy from
managerial misconduct can be predicted with relative certainty. Thus, it is not necessarily
correct to say that an investor who is permitted to recover for managerial misconduct is
recovering for a loss that is never suffered. Indeed, the latter statement would only be true if
the legal rules in effect at the time the investor purchased the shares in his portfolio made clear
that no recovery would be permitted for negligent misconduct. In that case, the price the
investor paid for the shares in his portfolio would have been discounted by the amount of the
losses that could be expected to flow from managerial misconduct. But if the rules in place at
the time of purchase made clear recovery would be permitted, then there would be no discount
at the time of purchase and thus no reason to bar legal liability. In short, whether or not a risk is
diversifiable does not determine whether the investor has suffered a loss worthy of
compensation.
65. Cf. 3A FLETCHER ETAL, supra note 12, § 1040.
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diversified one is." 66  In contrast, Professor Booth points out,
negligent business decisions sometimes turn out well and sometimes
turn out badly.67 But that a risk always results in losses (as opposed to
gains in some cases and losses in others) does not mean that the risk is
nondiversifiable. For if it did, property insurers, who cover risks from
fire, flood and earthquakes (which, like intentional misconduct,
always result in losses), would find themselves in a business that made
no economic sense. All that is required for a risk to be diversifiable is
for the losses from that risk to be predictable with greater certainty if
individual risks are pooled. So we may have no idea whether our own
house will burn down, but property insurers have a reasonably good
idea as to the overall level of losses from fire if they insure a sufficient
number of households. The same holds with business losses from
intentional misconducct: we may not know whether the managers of
any particular firm will engage in intentional misconduct, but we may
well be able to predict the overall level of losses from misconduct if
we invest in a sufficient number of companies. Accordingly, the risk
of intentional misconduct may be just as diversifiable as the risk of
negligent misconduct.68
III. THE LINK BETWEEN THE PREFERENCES OF DIVERSIFIED
SHAREHOLDERS AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
If the traditional explanations for the business judgment rule fail
to prove convincing, we must either abandon the rule or search for a
new explanation. In his article criticizing the traditional justifications
for the business judgment rule (often on similar grounds to those
advanced above), Professor Gevurtz suggests the former route,
66. Booth, supra note 27, at 462.
67. Id.
68. Some have also argued that the business judgment rule is based on the problems
associated with entrusting corporate litigation to shareholders and attorneys who often have
small, or nonexistent, economic stakes in the corporation. See, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, supra
note 16, at 271-74. Fischel and Bradley write as follows:
Shareholders with tiny investments can bring derivative actions on behalf of a
corporation. Because of his small stake in the venture, the complaining shareholder
(or his attorney) has very little incentive to consider the effect of the action on other
shareholders, the supposed beneficiaries, who ultimately bear the costs. If the action
appears to be a positive net value project because of the possible recovery of attorneys'
fees, an attorney will pursue it regardless of its effect on the value of the firm.
Id. at 271-72 (footnote omitted). Professor Gevurtz correctly notes that these may well be
problems with the derivative suit, but that these problems cannot justify the business judgment
rule because the latter rule applies even when the corporation's elected management maintains
the suit. Gevurtz, supra note 13, at 316.
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arguing that the business judgment rule "should be abolished and
directors.., required to live with the same rules of negligence as
everyone else. ' 69 This Article takes a different course, arguing
instead that the business judgment rule follows naturally from the
preferences of diversified shareholders.
As the analysis in Part I explains, diversified shareholders want
corporate managers to follow the net present value rule in making
capital investment decisions on the shareholders' behalf. Accord-
ingly, diversified shareholders want corporate managers to invest in
projects that have a positive net present value-that is, projects that
offer a rate of return on invested funds superior to the return that the
market demands for investments of comparable market (as opposed
to overall) risk. If corporate managers follow this strategy, diversified
shareholders will see the present value of their investment portfolios
increase with each investment decision. This is not to say that each
investment decision made by corporate managers following the net
present value rule will necessarily be vindicated by a successful
outcome, but only that the risk associated with the investment is
worth taking because the expected return is sufficiently high.
Moreover, the analysis in Part I suggests that undiversified investors
will also generally benefit if corporate managers follow the net
present value rule.
To ensure that managers follow the net present value rule in
making capital investment decisions, the corporation must be
structured to ensure that managers, like diversified shareholders, are
indifferent to the levels of diversifiable risk associated with different
projects. In other words, corporate managers must view projects with
identical levels of market risk and identical levels of expected returns
as equivalent, even if the projects have very different levels of
diversifiable risk. For example, corporate managers should consider
the investment option summarized earlier in Option #2 (an invest-
ment with a 50% chance of a 150% return and a 50% chance of a
-100% return with the outcome determined by an independent flip of
a fair coin)7° as equivalent to a government bond with a guaranteed
return of 25% because both have no sensitivity to market risk and
both have the same expected return (25%), even if Option #2
involves considerably more uncertainty for the particular firm making
the investment.
69. Gevurtz, supra note 13, at 289.
70. See supra Part I.
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The business judgment rule can be understood as a device that
helps ensure this managerial indifference to diversifiable risk. To see
why, consider the case of a corporate manager who might be sued if a
particular investment decision was not vindicated by a successful
outcome. Such a manager could hardly be indifferent as between
investment options that were identical in all respects, other than
diversifiable risk, because the project with the higher level of
diversifiable risk (i.e., the project whose outcome was subject to the
greatest uncertainty) would necessarily entail a greater risk of
personal liability. More generally, the corporate manager who faced
a risk of personal liability would tend to prefer projects with lower
overall risks to those with higher overall risks, even when the project
with the higher overall risk also had the higher net present value. The
business judgment rule helps overcome this concern by weakening a
significant source of managerial concern with diversifiable risk: legal
liability.71
As noted above,7 2 others have sometimes referred to the differing
sensitivities of shareholders and managers to business risk as a
potential explanation for the protection provided by the business
judgment rule. But these analyses have been brief and, more
importantly, incomplete: while diversified shareholders want
managers to be indifferent to the variance in project returns
attributable to diversifiable risk, they still want managers to pay close
attention to the variance attributable to market risk, as well as to the
project's overall level of expected returns. In other words, while the
business judgment rule offers the benefit of insulating managers from
factors diversified shareholders want ignored (i.e., diversifiable risk),
the business judgment rule also imposes costs by weakening
incentives to consider factors that shareholders deem important.
Thus, differing preferences of shareholders and managers for business
risk can only support the business judgment rule if the benefits of the
rule more than offset the costs. Commentators, like Fischel and
Bradley, have emphasized the limited costs of the business judgment
71. This is not to say that the business judgment rule, by itself, will enable managers to
completely ignore diversifiable risk. Potential legal liability for bad business decisions is only
one source of the managers' sensitivity to diversifiable risk. Another source of sensitivity,
discussed earlier, is management's concern about the potential loss of its firm-specific
investments if the firm fails or managers lose their jobs. As mentioned above, this concern can
be reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by compensating managers with stock options. See supra
p. 194-95. So the business judgment rule should be understood as only one of many devices
designed to insulate managers from diversifiable risk.
72. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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rule because of the availability of other mechanisms to constrain
managerial misconduct. 73  But these commentators have failed to
focus on the magnitude of the benefits of the business judgment rule,
leaving the ultimate balance between costs and benefits uncertain.
Although limited, the available evidence suggests that the bene-
fits from insulating managers from diversifiable risk are substantial.
Most significantly, the empirical evidence bearing on overall project
risk shows that diversifiable risk represents by far the lion's share of
the risk associated with any particular project. This empirical
evidence consists of "beta books," which set forth data for individual
securities, including, among other things, (1) the security's "beta,"
which measures the correlation between the security's returns and
movements in the market as a whole (i.e., the security's sensitivity to
market risk),74 (2) the portion of the variance in the security's returns
that can be explained by movements in the market as a whole (i.e.,
the variance attributable to market risk) and (3) the portion of the
variance in the security's returns that are explained by other factors
(i.e., the variance attributable to diversifiable risk). These beta books
show that as much as 80 to 90 percent, or more, of the variance in the
return to a particular security can be explained by diversifiable risk.75
One can infer from this that if one examined an individual project,
rather than a firm which is a collection of projects (and therefore
diversified at least to a limited extent), the results would be even
more striking: that is, that even a greater proportion of project risk
would be attributable to diversifiable, as opposed to market, risk.
Accordingly, in the absence of the business judgment rule, share-
holders could frequently expect differences in diversifiable risk to
play a dominant role in corporate decision making: where different
projects carry different levels of overall risk, and diversifiable risk is
the principal determinant of overall risk (as the evidence suggests),
managers who fear personal liability for bad outcomes (not just bad
decisions) would frequently be tempted to accept projects with lower
73. Fischel & Bradley, supra note 16, at 274-76.
74. The beta of a stock is its covariance with the market portfolio. Accordingly, a stock
with a beta of 1 varies as much as the market portfolio (i.e., if the value of the market portfolio
increases by 1%, the value of a stock with a beta of 1 will, on average, increase by 1%).
Similarly, a stock with a beta of 2 fluctuates twice as much as the market portfolio, while a stock
with a beta of fluctuates half as much. Risk-free securities like US Treasury Bonds have a
beta of 0, meaning that their value is independent of fluctuations in the value of the market
portfolio. See generally RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 23, app. at 7.
75. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 19, at 210 (reprinting a page from the Merrill
Lynch beta book).
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levels of diversifiable risk, even though other projects offer greater
net benefits to shareholders. Thus, by greatly reducing the potential
for legal liability, the business judgment rule dilutes a powerful
incentive for managers to focus on factors that diversified share-
holders want ignored. Coupled with Fischel and Bradley's finding
that the business judgment rule has only modest costs (due to the
availability of alternative constraints on managerial misconduct),76
this suggests that the business judgment rule does, in fact, offer
substantial net benefits to shareholders.
But, as the analysis in Part II makes clear, the real test for a
theory that explains judicial deference to corporate managers is
whether that theory can be reconciled with the more demanding
scrutiny applied to actions by doctors, lawyers and other profes-
sionals. And this is where a theory that focuses on the special
benefits of the business judgment rule for diversified shareholders
provides the greatest advantages over its competitors (particularly
theories like Fischel and Bradley's that emphasize the rule's limited
costs): of the principal-agent relationships considered in this Article
(i.e., shareholder-manager, doctor-patient and lawyer-client), the
shareholder-manager relationship is the only one where the principal
prefers the agent to ignore a substantial (and, in fact, overwhelming)
portion of the risk that is associated with the agent's decision.
Accordingly, if the business judgment rule is designed to address this
special concern of diversified shareholders, there is no reason to
apply the rule (or a similar one) to other relationships (i.e., doctor-
patient or lawyer-client) where this special concern is absent.
An example can best illustrate this point. Consider a patient who
consults a doctor about a serious injury to her arm. One course of
treatment will surely prevent her from losing her arm, but will not
restore any of the motion that has been lost. Another course of
treatment promises the hope of restoring full motion to the injured
arm, but if the treatment fails, amputation will be necessary. The
patient is not in a position to diversify away any significant portion of
the risk associated with the second procedure; the patient will
undergo the procedure only once and will face the full risk that that
her arm may be amputated. Because the patient faces the full risk
76. As noted above, corporate managers are subject to a variety of alternative governance
mechanisms that provide incentives to avoid mismanagement. These include shareholder voting
rights, freely transferable shares, institutional monitoring, external labor markets, the market
for corporate control and incentive compensation schemes. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note
16, at 274-76.
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associated with the particular procedure without any significant
potential for eliminating risk through diversification (regardless of
how many "second" opinions she obtains), she wants her agent, the
doctor, to consider the full risk as well. Accordingly, under the
theory considered in this Article, there is no reason to provide the
doctor with legal protections analogous to the business judgment rule.
Indeed, such a step would appear to be contrary to the patient's
interests, because it could lead the doctor to take insufficient account
of the risk to the patient.7
The analysis is only slightly more complicated in the lawyer-
client context. For the typical person who consults a lawyer only
rarely, there is little opportunity to significantly diversify away the
risk associated with using legal services. So there are few, if any, risks
that the client wants his attorney to ignore, and, therefore, little
reason to apply a rule analogous to the business judgment rule. For
the more sophisticated client, who makes more frequent use of
lawyers, there may be some potential for diversification. But even
here, it is doubtful that the amount of risk that can be eliminated
through diversification comes close to the 80 to 90 percent level that
exists in the investment context. Accordingly, the case for business-
judgment-rule-style deference, even limited to sophisticated clients, is
by no means clear.
Beyond providing a rationale for the business judgment rule that
can be reconciled with the different rules applied to doctors and
lawyers, the theory explored in this Article is also consistent with
some of the principal limitations on the business judgment rule.
Among other things, all agree that the business judgment rule does
not shield intentional misconduct, nor does it apply in cases where
corporate managers face material conflicts of interest.78 This result is
entirely consistent with the theory advanced here because this theory
77. The situation might be different, of course, if the patient was a millipede and had
suffered the same injury to each of its one thousand legs. In that case, the millipede might want
each doctor who would operate on one of its legs to treat the procedure as risk-free, because the
millipede could have a high degree of confidence regarding the outcome of all one thousand
procedures. In other words, because of its capacity to diversify away the risk, the millipede
might know that the procedure will likely succeed in five hundred cases and fail in five hundred
others, even if he does not know exactly which legs would be restored and which would be
amputated. So the millipede might benefit from protection analogous to the business judgment
rule for its doctors. But people are not millipedes, and multiple injuries similar to the
millipede's that permit the patient to diversify away a substantial portion of the risk associated
with medical treatment are difficult to imagine. The point here is not that patients have no
ability to diversify away the risk associated with medical treatment, but only that their capacity
to diversify away risk does not approach that of shareholders with respect to business risks.
78. 3A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 12, § 1040.
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expressly recognizes that legal liability has a role to play in ensuring
that managers act in accordance with shareholder interests.
Admittedly, the analysis above suggests that the costs of legal liability
will ordinarily exceed the gains because the potential for legal liability
causes diversifiable risk to dominate managerial decision making.
But there may be some limited instances where this is not true. For
instance, Professors Fischel and Bradley note that "[t]he larger the
potential gains from [managerial misconduct], the more important, all
else equal, are liability rules"79 when compared to the alternative
governance mechanisms. Accordingly, Fischel and Bradley suggest
that liability rules might have an important role to play in deterring
"one-shot frauds. '80 The same line of argument could suggest a role
for liability rules more generally in cases involving intentional
misconduct or conflicts of interests because the latter cases may well
involve larger potential gains for corporate managers than cases
involving ordinary negligence.
Further, as Professor Gevurtz points out,81 the business judgment
rule has absolutely no application in suits by third parties who have
arguably suffered damage as a result of corporate negligence. For
example, as noted above,82 the business judgment rule would have no
application in a case where coastal property owners claimed injury
from an oil spill by an allegedly defective oil tanker. Like cases based
on intentional misconduct or conflicts of interest, suits against the
corporation by third parties are consistent with the rationale for the
business judgment rule offered here. Under that rationale, the
purpose of the business judgment rule is to permit corporate
managers to treat similar projects, with different levels of diversifiable
risk, as equivalents, not to protect corporate shareholders from the
costs of corporate conduct. Permitting suits by third parties against
the corporation, as opposed to the managers personally, in no way
interferes with this goal. At the same time, permitting suits by third
parties advances the social goal of ensuring that all actors, including
corporations, consider the costs of their actions on third parties.
79. Fischel & Bradley, supra note 16, at 270.
80. Id.
81. See Gevurtz, supra note 13, at 325.
82. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The business judgment rule has been a centerpiece of corporate
law for almost two centuries. But over the last several decades, courts
and commentators have struggled to find a rationale for the business
judgment rule that, at once, reconciles the judicial deference granted
to corporate managers with the more demanding standards applied to
other professionals, such as doctors and lawyers. This Article
attempts to end this struggle by offering a fuller account of the
relationship between the preferences of diversified shareholders, on
the one hand, and liability rules, on the other. Based on this account,
this Article contends that the protections of the business judgment
rule are necessary to address a concern unique to the corporate
setting: the need to prevent diversifiable risk from dominating agent
(i.e., managerial) decision making.
